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1 Introduction
Two recent foci for attention to infinite idealizations in philosophy of sci-
ence have been minimal models, and a distinction between idealization and
approximation. Minimal models are distinguished by having their explana-
tory or inferential power derive from their highly idealized nature (Batter-
man, 2002). In conflict with more traditional accounts of idealized models
in science, according to which any de-idealization making the model more
referentially accurate is desirable, minimal models succeed only by omitting
or simplifying unimportant details. For example, under typical conditions
the description of phase transitions in materials is greatly facilitated by the
so-called thermodynamic limit, an idealization of the material as an infinite
collection instead of a large but finite number of interacting molecules. Un-
derstanding the generic and universal properties of materials would only be
hindered by adding these details back in. In other words, for minimal models,
less is more.
Sometimes, though, an attempted idealization would force a model to
have a property inconsistent with its other essential properties. For exam-
ple, idealizing a large sphere of radius r as having an infinite radius allows
one to make precise the sense in which the ratio of a large sphere’s surface
area (4pir2) to its volume (4pir3/3) is negligibly small. Yet there is no locus
of points in Euclidean space infinitely far away from any other. So, while
∗Thanks to two anonymous referees and to Ota´vio Bueno for suggestions to clarify my
argument, especially in section 3.3.
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there is no model of an infinite sphere, one can still approximate the surface-
area-to-volume ratio of a large sphere as zero. According to a distinction
proposed by Norton (2012), then, an idealization is a model (within a cer-
tain specified class) that describes a target inexactly (or incompletely), while
an approximation is only an inexact description of a property of a model.
The goal of the present note is to entwine these two strands. In doing
so, I have two modest goals. The first, in section 2, to is point out a way
in which the strategy of minimal modeling extends beyond idealized models
per se to approximations. A minimal approximation, in this sense, is an
inexact description of a property of some model or class of models that is
more successful than certain more exact descriptions because it omits or
simplifies details that are irrelevant for the purposes towards which that
model or class of models is put. Because (mere) approximations distort or
abstract from properties of models rather than models themselves, they can
be used even when the desired models do not exist, or when it is not as
clear that the models represent concrete systems of interest. Such cases (as
discussed in section 3) can arise when one uses minimal approximations to
infer properties of a theory. However one uses them, though, they can be
justified in similar ways as minimal models by showing that regardless of how
one relaxes the approximation (i.e., how one introduces further details), the
conclusions that one would draw from using the approximation still hold (as
least approximately).
The second goal is to apply this idea of minimal approximations to the
case of Norton’s dome (2008), a simple purported classical mechanical model
that violates determinism: the dome is shaped so that a particle beginning
at rest on the top may spontaneously slide down at an arbitrary time. Nor-
ton’s description employs a inertial reference frame associated with the (in
principle) accelerating dome, which Laraudogoitia (2013) points out is not
strictly achievable in classical mechanics. This raises the question of the
justification of the approximation, i.e., whether the failure of determinism is
only an artifact introduced by the approximation itself. In section 3, I show
that the answer to this question is negative: the violation of determinism is
not affected when the reference frame is in fact slightly non-inertial. Further-
more, I argue that the inertial reference frame counts as a minimal (infinite)
approximation in the sense that, in giving an inexact description of a class of
classical mechanical models, it shows that a wide range of particular details
about the mass of the dome, or whatever massive objects it is sitting on, are
not relevant to the claim about classical physics that the dome is intended
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to illustrate.
Before continuing, I wish to offer a couple of comments on the scope of
the foregoing discussion. First, I acknowledge that there is considerable de-
bate regarding whether minimal models provide knowledge or allow users to
truly learn about their targets. Addressing these objections, as important
as they are, is beyond the scope of the present note because a commitment
to the justified utility of minimal approximations does not entail a similar
commitment to that of minimal models. This is because minimal approxima-
tions need not describe inexactly or even refer to a concrete target system:
they only describe a property of a model inexactly. Indeed, one of the ad-
vantages of Norton’s dome scenario to illustrate an example of a minimal
approximation is that it is intended as a means to learn about the (failure
of) deterministic properties of classical mechanics, not any concrete physical
system.
This brings me to my second scope comment: I also acknowledge there
is considerable debate regarding whether Norton’s dome scenario, regardless
of whether it is described with an approximation, is a legitimate model of
classical mechanics. Here I shall assume the perspective of Fletcher (2012)
that there are many theories of classical mechanics with varying models, used
in varying contexts, some of which are deterministic and some of which are
not. The conclusions drawn about Norton’s dome are thus relative to theories
that admit it as a model.
2 Minimal Approximations
In this section I describe in more detail the concept of a minimal approxima-
tion and its relationship with minimal models and the approximation/idealization
distinction. To begin with the approximation/idealization distinction, here
is how Norton (2012, p. 209) describes it:
An approximation is an inexact description of a target system. It
is propositional.
An idealization is a real or fictitious system, distinct from the
target system, some of whose properties provide an inexact de-
scription of some aspects of the target system.
Note that the success conditions for both of these are not specified, for which
properties one should consider, and how inexact (or abstracted) they may
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be, ought to be a contextual matter. What is important is rather that an
idealization is a new model. So, if an idealization is intended to be within
the purview of a theory, it must be a model (that is, represent a possible
state of affairs) permitted by that theory. By contrast, an approximation is
only a new description of (a property of) a model.
With this distinction in mind, a minimal model is explicitly an idealiza-
tion in this sense: it is highly inexact (i.e., “highly idealized”), but that does
not mean it is ipso facto unsuccessful. Rather it is through artful inexactness
that it
does not let a lot of [extraneous] details get in the way. In many
cases, the fine details will not be needed to characterize the phe-
nomenon of interest, and may, in fact, actually detract from an
understanding of that phenomenon. . . .The adding of details with
the goal of “improving” the minimal model [i.e., of making the
model less inexact,] is self-defeating—such improvement is illu-
sory. (Batterman, 2002, p. 22)
For accounts of physical phenomena, a minimal model is thus one “which
most economically caricatures the essential physics” (Goldenfeld, 1992, p. 33).
A minimal model therefore accrues computational and explanatory advan-
tages because the descriptions it gives can apply equally well (even though
usually not exactly) to a wide variety of target systems, ones distinguished
by details ignored or simplified by the minimal model.
Because a minimal model succeeds in virtue of what it does and does not
describe rather than by being a model per se, it would seem that the same
strategy of minimality could be employed for approximation. Indeed:
An idealization can be demoted to an approximation by discard-
ing the idealizing system and merely extracting the inexact de-
scription; however, the inverse promotion to an idealizing system
will not always succeed. (Norton, 2012, p. 211)
The general failure of the “inverse promotion” is important here because it
indicates that the strategy of minimal approximation may succeed when the
strategy of minimal modeling cannot. Principally, by no longer requiring that
the (approximated) descriptions together cohere for a model in a specified
class, they allow one to implement the strategy of minimality outside of that
class. For example, the target of an approximation can well be a property
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of a model or a collection of models, rather than a property of a concrete
system. This allows one to apply minimal approximations to models of a
theory, say, that are not even intended to represent concrete systems, giving
inexact descriptions of their properties in order to draw conclusions about
those models (hence about the theory of which they are a part), regardless
of whether the approximated description could obtain exactly in any model
of the theory.
I shall argue in the next section that Norton’s dome scenario is such an
application. Before doing so, I wish to note something about the justification
of minimal approximations. Just as they extend, in a sense, the applicability
of the minimal strategy for models, minimal approximations can be justified
along the same lines. In both cases, one must show, inasmuch as possible,
that the inexactness introduced is not responsible for important features of
the resulting description. In other words, to show that an approximation or
idealization is minimal, one must show that the details it simplifies or ignores
actually don’t matter to conclusions one wishes to draw. It is important that
this justification is not achieved through the addition of particular descriptive
details—a de-idealization or increased representational exactness—for that
would defeat the purpose of the strategy of minimality. Rather, one describes
the additional details generically, then shows that those details do not play
any role in the conclusions derived. In this way, the justification has a form
analogous to the inference rule of universal generalization from predicate
logic.
3 The Case of Norton’s Dome
In this section I argue that the description of the dome in Norton (2008)
counts as a minimal approximation. Section 3.1 describes the dome sce-
nario and exhibits the family of solutions to the system’s equation of motion
that witness the failure of determinism.1 Section 3.2 outlines the criticism
by Laraudogoitia (2013) of the dome scenario, which I argue amounts to a
demand for the justification of the use of an approximation, namely that a
certain reference frame is inertial. Finally, section 3.3 shows how this ap-
proximation is justified, and argues that the approximation is minimal, for
it eliminates details about the mass distribution of objects in dome scenario
1This section is based on the analysis in Fletcher (2012, §2.2) and Malament (2008,
§4–5).
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that are inessential for understanding the failure of determinism that they
manifest.
3.1 Setting the Ground
Norton (2008) considers a cylindrically symmetric dome on which a point
particle of mass m slides under the influence of a uniform gravitational force
directed parallel to the dome’s axis of symmetry. The dome’s surface may be
described as the surface of revolution of the curve γ : [0, r0]→ R2 described
in x-y-coordinates (i.e., with the z-coordinates suppressed):
γ(r) = (γx(r), γy(r)) =
(
2g2
3b4
− 2g
2
3b4
(
1− b
4r
g2
)3/2
,−2b
2
3g
r3/2
)
, (1)
where r is the arc length of this generatrix, g is the constant free acceleration
due to gravity, b is a dimensional constant, and x and y are, respectively,
horizontal and vertical coordinates (the latter parallel to the dome’s axis of
symmetry). If the particle is constrained to move on the surface, then in
general the force propelling the particle down the slope is the component of
the total force F tangential to the surface:
F|| =
(
dγ
dr
· F
)
dγ
dr
. (2)
Its tangential acceleration, meanwhile, is in general
a|| =
(
d2r
dt2
)
dγ
dr
. (3)
Combining equations 2 and 3 with the identity F|| = ma|| yields the scalar
equation of motion for the distance traversed r as
d2r
dt2
=
dγ
dr
· F
m
, (4)
where
dγ
dr
=
((
1− b
4r
g2
)1/2
,−b
2
g
r1/2
)
. (5)
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Applying equation 5 and the fact that F = (0,−mg) to equation 4 then
yields
d2r
dt2
= −gdγy
dr
= b2
√
r. (6)
Supposing that the particle is placed at rest the top of the dome at time
t = 0, one can show via a straightforward calculation that
r(t) =
{
0, if t ≤ T,
1
144
(b[t− T ])4, if t > T, (7)
is a solution to its equation of motion (6) where T is any nonnegative real
number whatsoever. Consequently, the dome-and-particle system with a uni-
form gravitational force is not deterministic since there is a non-denumerable
number of distinct solutions to the particle’s equation of motion.
Note a couple of assumptions crucial to this analysis and central to the
following discussion: first, the application of equation 6 assumes that a ref-
erence frame in which the dome is at rest is inertial; second, neither the total
mass nor the mass distribution within the rigid dome (and whatever it may
be attached to) need be invoked. The first figures in the criticism of the
analysis by Laraudogoitia (2013), while the second figures in the claim that
the approximation yielding an inertial reference frame is in fact minimal.
3.2 The Inertial Approximation
Laraudogoitia (2013) criticizes the use of a uniform gravitational field in
the dome system. His primary complaint derives from the fact that the
frame of reference in which the motion of the particle is described cannot
be inertial—that is, Newton’s second law would not hold—unless it assumes
that the particle’s acceleration is due to gravitational interaction with an
infinite mass:
[Norton] applies Newton’s second law in a frame of reference R
linked to [the dome] D and he does it in such a way as to presup-
pose that the frame is inertial. But D interacts with [the particle]
P despite being at rest in the inertial system R (P’s movements
do not affect D). This is only possible if the mass of D is infinite,
or if the mass of D+M is (M being some material body rigidly
joined to D). (Laraudogoitia, 2013, p. 2930)
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The argument runs in more detail as follows: according to Newton’s third
law, two objects interacting under mutual gravitational influence exert equal
and opposite forces on one another. The particle in the dome system experi-
ences a gravitational force in falling down the dome, so the massive objects
generating that force—whether just the dome itself or the dome along with
some other object(s)—experience an equal and oppositely directed force. Yet
the reference frame used to describe the motion of the particle, in which the
dome is at rest, is assumed to be inertial. The reference frame of an object
experiencing a net force can only be inertial if that object has an infinite
mass (for otherwise the object would be accelerating).2 But if the object has
infinite mass, then the gravitational acceleration it induces for the particle
is infinite, not finite, as is assumed in the description of the dome and par-
ticle system.3 Thus the dome scenario is not idealized, since as it cannot be
described as a consistent model within classical mechanics with Newtonian
gravitation, in contrast to what Norton (2008, p. 795) claims.4 But it can be
said to use an approximation, since treating the reference frame of the dome
as inertial is an inexact description of its actual, non-inertial reference frame
in a consistent model of classical mechanics.
It’s important to emphasize that the use of this approximation does not
make the description of dome scenario illegitimate for Laraudogoitia, as he
2This assumes some delicate details about how classical mechanics ought to treat sys-
tems of infinite mass. However, even if one takes infinitely massive systems as falling
outside the scope of classical mechanics, the conclusion of the argument would still hold,
for in that case no reference frame of an object experiencing a net force can be inertial.
3Laraudogoitia (2013, p. 2930) draws the further conclusion that the “infinite mass
must be distributed across an infinite region of space because infinite mass distributed in
a finite region of space has no physical meaning, at least if one does not ‘decouple’ the
gravitational interaction,” i.e., no longer require that gravitational and inertial mass be
equal to each other. This conclusion is correct, but not for quite the reasons Laraudogoitia
gives. There are perfectly mundane distributions of total infinite mass in a finite region
of space—consider, for example, the mass density ρ(r) ∝ 1/r for 0 < r < 1, and ρ(r) = 0
otherwise—but the mass concerned must nevertheless be distributed in an infinite region of
space in order to generate a uniform gravitational attraction. In any case, this conclusion
is not essential for the present discussion.
4In the terminology of Norton (2008), this is called a strong failure of internal idealiza-
tion. The dome scenario has also been criticized as involving illegitimate idealizations, e.g.
of infinite rigidity (Korolev, 2007a,b), but Norton (2008, p. 795) correctly points out that
there can be no failure of idealization—what he calls in that paper “external idealization”—
if the model in question is not intended to represent an independently specified system or
phenomenon.
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recognizes that, commonly in classical mechanics,
an assumption of infinite mass is introduced to simplify calcula-
tion when we know that it will not affect the qualitative charac-
teristics of the resulting evolution. This is where the difference
from Norton’s dome lies: in this last case we do not know if the
indeterminism will be maintained when the mass of the dome is
finite, (Laraudogoitia, 2013, p. 2930)
that is, whether the infinite approximation is justified in the sense described
in the previous subsection. Until the question of justification of the approxi-
mation has been discharged, the analysis of the dome as manifesting a failure
of determinism remains inconclusive. He ends with the charge that
the burden of proof falls on anyone arguing that indeterminism is
maintained in Norton’s model even with total finite mass. I have
no proof that with total finite mass there is no indeterminism
and resolving the question looks complicated to say the least.
(Laraudogoitia, 2013, p. 2931)
In the following subsection I resolve this question. Readers uninterested in
the technical details may skip to the last two paragraphs of that subsection
for a summary and discussion.
3.3 Justifying the Inertial Approximation
My goal in this section is to show that even when the particle and dome
are both allowed to accelerate under their mutual (finite) gravitational force,
the system remains indeterministic. To do so, I show that the particle can
still fall down in the reference frame of the dome without assuming that this
reference frame is inertial.
So, consider again the system with the point particle of mass m sliding
under the influence of Newtonian gravitation on the dome, which is possibly
attached rigidly to some other object. To show that the inertial approx-
imation for the reference frame of the dome is justified, one can work in
that reference frame using, for the particle, the modified version of Newton’s
second law adapted to non-inertial reference frames (Thornton and Marion,
2004, p. 392):
F = Fnet −mω˙ × γ −mω × (ω × γ)− 2mω × γ˙, (8)
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where Fnet is the net force on the particle in any inertial reference frame,
γ is the location of the particle on the dome given by equation 1, ω is the
angular velocity of the dome’s reference frame with respect to any inertial
reference frame, and the overdot represents differentiation with respect to
time. The second term arises from the angular acceleration of the reference
frame, while the third and fourth terms are the (“fictional”) centrifugal and
Coriolis forces, respectively.
It will be helpful to write the first term as Fnet = F|| +Fcor, where F|| is
the force that would arise in the original dome scenario analyzed in section
3.1, with an unmoving dome and a uniform gravitational force, and Fcor is
the “correction” to it arising from non-uniformities in the gravitational force
and corresponding differences in the normal force of the dome keeping the
particle passing through its surface. Then define
f = F − F|| = Fcor −mω˙ × γ −mω × (ω × γ)− 2mω × γ˙, (9)
which represents the net apparent force on the particle departing from F||,
whether due to the “correction” force Fcor or any “fictitious” forces arising
from describing the motion of the particle in a non-inertial reference frame.
Combining the analysis of section 3.1 (equations 2–4) with equation 9
yields that5
r¨(r) = −gdγy(r)
dr
+
dγ(r)
dr
· f(r)
m
.
Next, applying equation 6 and the fact that r¨ = [d(r˙2)/dr]/2 allows one to
solve for d(r˙2)/dr:
d(r˙2)
dr
(r) = 2
(
b2
√
r +
dγ(r)
dr
· f(r)
m
)
.
Integrating this ordinary differential equation using the dummy variable r′,
from r′ = 0 to r′ = r, and assuming the same initial conditions as before,
i.e., that the particle begins at rest at the top of the dome (r˙(0) = 0), then
returns that
r˙(r) =
√
4b2r3/2
3
+
2W (r)
m
, (10)
where
W (r) =
∫ r
0
dγ(r′)
dr′
· f(r′) dr′ (11)
5The general strategy for the following calculations is found in Norton (2008, Appendix)
and Laraudogoitia (2013, fn. 3).
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is a kind of (effective) work done by the net apparent “correction” force f
on the particle in the dome’s reference frame. Inverting equation 10 to solve
for t in terms of r results in
t(r) =
∫ r
0
(
4b2(r′)3/2
3
+
2W (r′)
m
)−1/2
dr′. (12)
This describes the time t needed for the particle to traverse a distance r along
the surface of the dome. If determinism were to hold, then the particle would
remain at the top of the dome (r = 0) forever, so that the integral would be
infinite (or undefined). Thus, if this integral exists and is finite (at least for
sufficiently small r), then determinism fails.
To show that the integral of equation 12 is indeed finite, it suffices to
show that there are positive constants C and  such that
b2
√
r +
dγ(r)
dr
· f(r)
m
> Cr1− (13)
for sufficiently small r > 0. For, in this case, the integral of both sides (from
0 to r) would yield
4b2r3/2
3
+
2W (r)
m
>
2C
1− r
2− (14)
after multiplying by two and using both equation 11 and the fact that both
sides of the inequality are non-negative. Rearranging inequality 14 after
taking the square root of both sides, then integrating again, reveals that
t(r) <
∫ r
0
√
1− 
2C(r′)2−
dr′ =
√
2(1− )r
C2
, (15)
hence t(r) would be finite.
So, to prove inequality 13, first note that for any C and  < 1/2, b2
√
r >
Cr1− for sufficiently small r > 0. Thus it suffices to find conditions under
which the remaining terms do not alter this inequality too much. Calculating
that
dγ
dr
· f
m
=
dγ
dr
·
(
Fcor
m
− ω˙ × γ − ω × (ω × γ)− 2ω × γ˙
)
(16)
using equation 9 (and dropping the argument r to reduce clutter), one can
analyze first the term containing the “correction” force Fcor: it is always
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non-negative so long as the magnitude of the component of the gravitational
force on the particle tangential to the dome is non-decreasing as the particle
slides down. This will be the case for sufficiently small r when the dome
system is sufficiently far away from other gravitational sources besides the
dome (and whatever it might be attached to).
Second, the last term, involving the Coriolis force, vanishes, as γ˙ =
(dγ/dr)(dr/dt), so in fact ω × γ˙ and dγ/dr are orthogonal. Since the re-
maining terms are negative but vanish at r = 0, to prove inequality 13 it will
suffice to show that their magnitude grows no faster than b2
√
r for small r.
To do this, it will be helpful to bound their magnitudes using the fact that
|a · b| ≤ |a||b| and |a× b| ≤ |a||b| for any vectors a, b, and that |dγ/dr| = 1
by direct calculation from equation 5:∣∣∣∣dγdr · (ω˙ × γ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ |ω˙||γ|,∣∣∣∣dγdr · (ω × (ω × γ))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ |ω|2|γ|.
Inspection of equation 1 indicates that |γ| grows no faster than √r for small
r,6 while |ω| and |ω˙| are both non-negative and continuous functions of r,
vanishing at r = 0. Hence for small r, both terms are in fact bounded above
in magnitude by |γ|. This shows that both of the middle two negative terms
of equation 16 are dominated by b2
√
r for small r, proving that inequality 13
holds.
The foregoing have therefore established the justification for the inertial
approximation used in Norton’s original dome scenario, for, under the right
conditions, the conclusions drawn from the approximation about the failure
of determinism still hold when the reference frame of the dome is more exactly
6In fact, one can show that |γ(r)| grows no faster than Ar for some A > 0 when r
is small, as its derivative at r = 0 is positive and finite. To show this, without loss of
generality select units in which b2 = g. Then |γ(r)| = 23 [(1 − (1 − r)3/2)2 + r3]1/2 =
2
3 [2− 3r − 2(1− r)3/2 + 3r2]1/2. Direct calculation shows that
d|γ(r)|
dr
=
(1− r)1/2 + 2r − 1
[2− 3r − 2(1− r)3/2 + 3r2]1/2 .
Although the limit r → 0 yields an indeterminate form, one can perform the substitution
z = (1 − r)1/2, rewrite the resulting fraction as a square root with which one commutes
the limit z → 1, then apply l’Hoˆpital’s rule.
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treated as being slightly non-inertial. These conditions are fairly simple: the
mass of the dome system must be distributed so that, at least for locations
close to the apex of the dome (i.e., for small r), the net gravitational force
on the particle into the dome is not less than that which would arise from a
uniform gravitational force, as treated in section 3.1 and considered originally
by Norton (2008).7 This will be case if the dome system is sufficiently far
away from other large gravitational sources.
Moreover, this all shows that the approximation is a minimal one, for it
reveals that details about the construction of the dome (outside of a neighbor-
hood of its apex) and that of any object to which it is attached do not matter
for the conclusions about the failure of determinism. Adding in those details
would only complicate the dome scenario, distracting one from the essential
aspects of the physics. Finally, the justification of the minimal approxima-
tion did not require this detail either, for it described the system without
the inertial approximation generically, to which universal generalization was
applied.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
In this note, I’ve suggested how the strategy of minimality employed for
models—idealize as much as possible to simplify or abstract away details
extraneous from the essential features—can be extended to approximations,
too, and justified in much the same way. This expands the scope of the
strategy because approximations are only inexact descriptions of a model:
they do not require a new model or even a particular concrete system to
describe. So, while the question of whether, and if so, how minimal models
inform us of their target systems is important, this question needn’t arise for
minimal approximations, which make possible broader and more insightful
inferences and calculations about properties of a model or models one already
has.8
In my application of these ideas to Norton’s dome scenario, I have argued
7This requirement implies, of course, that the particle must not lose contact with the
dome, at least initially. See Malament (2008) for a discussion of this issue in the original
dome scenario.
8In this sense, minimal approximations fit with the perspective of Knuuttila and Boon
(2011), who wish to reduce the representational role for models in favor of their use as
tools to forge more general representational relationships.
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that it uses a minimal approximation of an inertial reference frame, showing
that the details of the distribution of mass in the dome (and whatever it may
be attached to) are not important for the demonstration of the failure of de-
terminism. It is intended as a vehicle for inference about classical mechanics,
not a model for a real-world system, so the question of the exactness of its
description does not arise. This answers Laraudogoitia’s concern that the
scenario must assign an infinite mass to the dome.
I suspect that one can fruitfully identify minimal approximations in many
other circumstances in the foundations of science. To take some examples
from physics, Norton (2012, §4.2) himself suggests that many techniques from
statistical mechanics, as well as reversible processes in thermodynamics (Nor-
ton, 2014) are approximations rather than idealizations. Further, Fletcher
(2017, p. 190) raises the question of whether point test particles in space-
time theories count as idealizations, but perhaps they are better understood
as approximations.9 Showing that these are minimal, and justified, would go
a long way towards a better understanding of the conceptual basis of those
theories.
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